As in previous years, Latvia was not among the priority intelligence targets of Chinese special services in 2025. However, they maintained an interest in information about political processes, current defense issues, the economic situation in Latvia, as well as Latvia's activity in NATO and EU institutions and their agenda. China still had the greatest potential for obtaining intelligence through activities from its territory, facilitated by trips of Latvian citizens to China and a non-critical attitude towards threats from this country. By providing Latvians with the opportunity to go on funded visits, Chinese institutions and organizations created conditions for Chinese intelligence to select and recruit potential sources of information and interest lobbyists, the report notes. According to information available to the Security Police, in 2025, representatives from academia and the scientific community, politicians, entrepreneurs, and cultural figures went on such trips. Often, after these visits, individuals consciously or unconsciously began to lobby for China's interests — calling for closer cooperation and disseminating the official messages of the Communist Party of China on strategically important topics for it. Last year, China primarily used so-called "soft power" to strengthen its influence in Latvia: promoting Chinese culture, enhancing academic cooperation, and striving in other forms to create an image of a reliable, peace-loving partner focused on the common good. Nevertheless, according to the Security Police, these activities of China are also associated with intelligence risks, as the legislation of the People's Republic of China obliges Chinese companies and citizens to assist the state, including intelligence services, when necessary. This requirement also applies to Chinese companies registered abroad and to Chinese citizens living, working, or studying abroad. Thus, China employs a so-called "whole-of-society approach" to obtain the information of interest, including scientific and economic intelligence information. According to the Security Police, the greatest influence of China is still observed in the Latvian academic and research environment. China continued to use existing cooperation formats, such as the network of Confucius Institutes and agreements with higher education institutions in Latvia, while also offering new ones. The Security Police also established that proposals for cooperation in the academic field were one of the priority topics during visits by Chinese delegations and the leadership of the Confucius Institute in individual municipalities of Latvia. Additional intelligence risks persisted due to the use of technologies produced in China in state-significant facilities and institutions, as well as in companies working with sensitive data.