This was reported by the newspaper **De Volkskrant**, [which published](https://www.volkskrant.nl/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F) a reconstruction of the events in the months leading up to the war on February 24, 2022. To prepare the material, journalists spoke with 19 intelligence officers and high-ranking officials, [reports](https://nos.nl/artikel/2622145-aivd-en-mivd-zagen-russische-invasie-van-oekraine-niet-aankomen) NOS. ### The Dutch Assessment Reached Biden The assessments of the Dutch intelligence services were also communicated to U.S. President Joe Biden, who had been warning allies since the fall of 2021 about the high likelihood of a Russian invasion. In the Netherlands, there was hope that diplomatic efforts would help avoid war. However, many participants in those events today believe that such an assessment deprived the West of almost its only chance to prevent the conflict. In their opinion, if the U.S. and European countries had made it clear to Moscow in advance that they were ready for the toughest military and economic measures, it could have served as a deterrent. One high-ranking official also noted that the erroneous analysis led European countries not to increase military assistance to Ukraine in the months leading up to the invasion. ### Betting on a Source in the Kremlin The conclusion that a Russian invasion was “unlikely” was based on information received from a trusted source, who was allegedly close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. This source had been considered extremely valuable to the Dutch intelligence services for many years and provided access to information from the Russian security apparatus. According to AIVD and MIVD, the buildup of Russian troops at the border with Ukraine was supposed to strengthen Moscow's position in negotiations with the West. It was assumed that Putin would not start a war, as it would deprive him of his negotiating advantages. In the U.S., on the contrary, there was a conviction that the question was not **whether** an invasion would occur, but **when exactly** it would start. American intelligence had been warning for several months that Russia was actively preparing for an attack. According to the publication, the U.S. also had a source in the Kremlin, who was likely even closer to Putin. Although the Dutch intelligence services exchanged information with the CIA, they could not determine the reasons for such differing assessments. Only after the war began did it become clear that even the highest leadership of the Russian security agencies was as surprised by Putin's decision to start the invasion as they were. ### Lessons from the Iraq War As noted by **De Volkskrant**, the reason for the erroneous assessment was not only trust in their source. The position of the Dutch intelligence services was also influenced by the experience of the 2003 Iraq War, when American intelligence mistakenly claimed that Baghdad possessed weapons of mass destruction. The subsequent invasion led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Skepticism towards U.S. warnings was not only present in the Netherlands but also in Germany and France. One high-ranking official recalls that during meetings of European ministers, concerns were voiced: “We are being drawn into a war.” For a long time, Ukraine itself did not believe in the inevitability of an invasion. It was only three weeks before the war began that the position of AIVD and MIVD changed. Intelligence received data about the transfer of large supplies of blood plasma to the front line — an important sign of preparations for large-scale hostilities. After that, the likelihood of war was raised from “unlikely” to “possible.” ### “The Biggest Intelligence Failure” After the invasion began, Dutch intelligence services found that the leadership of the Russian security agencies was just as surprised by Putin's decision as they were. Only a narrow circle of the president's most trusted individuals knew about the preparations for war. The source of AIVD and MIVD was not part of this circle, while the U.S. source likely had more complete information. One of the interviewees for **De Volkskrant** admitted: > “This is the largest war in Europe since World War II. And we did not see its approach. This was a real failure.” Some participants in the events directly call what happened an intelligence failure. However, one high-ranking AIVD official disagreed with this assessment. According to him, the main lesson was a change in attitude towards the Russian president. > “I think it would be fair to say that now we would look at Putin with much greater distrust. We had too long assumed that he acted rationally,” he noted. ### The Embassy Prepared for War Particularly painful for the intelligence services was the fact that Dutch military and diplomats increasingly trusted American intelligence data in the weeks leading up to the invasion and were already assuming a high likelihood of war. The Dutch ambassador to Ukraine came to this conclusion several months before the invasion began and started preparing the diplomatic mission for possible developments. In mid-February, he urged Dutch citizens to leave Ukraine if there was no urgent need to stay, and also evacuated his wife and the families of embassy staff. The then Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra ordered the embassy staff to be transferred to Lviv. The day after the start of the Russian invasion, the diplomatic mission staff left Ukraine in a convoy of armored vehicles. According to the publication's sources, the events of early 2022 became one of the most serious tests for the Dutch intelligence services. Today, AIVD and MIVD acknowledge that when assessing the Kremlin's intentions, it is necessary to consider not only intelligence data but also the possibility that key decisions may be made in an extremely narrow circle of individuals.